Nor is consent valid if it is issued by a representative who has ignored the restrictions to which he is subjected by his sovereign during the negotiations if the other contracting parties have been informed of these restrictions before it is signed. [Citation required] It seems very likely that federal states could be included in the word «state» within the meaning of the Wiener Convention. This should come as no surprise, given that the Constitution of many federations explicitly recognizes: that their federal states have recognized treaty-related powers without such federal states being «sovereign states»:»: the «regions» and the «Communities»» of Belgium, the provinces of Argentina, the Austrian states, the Swiss cantons, Bosnia and Herzegovina, two «entities» etc.» , the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Union points out that the text provides that, although the European Union has exclusive powers in certain areas, the EU`s constituent entities retain their contractual powers in a multitude of jurisdictions. Finally, let us not forget that an draft version of Article 6 of the Vienna Convention – at the time Article 5, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty – explicitly recognized a jus tractatum for the federal states on the condition that the Federal Constitution grant them such powers. In an opinion on draft articles on treaty law, the International Law Commission stated that it was true that informative statements on what other actors would do in certain future circumstances would help to coordinate mutual action by creating a focal point for actors to adapt their behaviour. With a classic coordination problem, it is more important for players that everyone chooses an identical strategy than what this specific strategy is. A good example of a coordination problem is the choice of the side of the road where cars must drive. If we assume that there are no intrinsic reasons to choose one part over another, i.e. there is no reason to drive to one side or the other, apart from the behaviour of other drivers, the problem becomes a problem of coordinating the individual decision of all, in order to avoid head-on crashes and ensure the efficient use of the road. In these circumstances, obtaining information through the point of contact should be sufficient for rational actors to be reconciled, since it is the coordination that will be most beneficial for each of them.
In such a situation, if a player does not act according to the coordinated solution, each player loses, including the defector. There are therefore cases where it is true that the parties might not want to be bound by a commitment, but simply exchange information about the future behaviour of interested parties in order to adapt their own. But this particular case is far from covering all possible contexts in which cooperation is sought. Coordination is far from exhausting the range of problems that cooperation can address. Government initiatives that are products of expertise, means and incentives, and the misdirection of power and expertise weaken the ability of federations to act reasonably in international affairs if their central authorities do not allow the federal states to take their place in the decision-making process.